REMARKS

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It is really a great treat for me to be back on a university campus, particularly that of the University of Kentucky. As Professor Davis said, I have been here before, have enjoyed it each time, and I know I am going to enjoy being here with you this evening.

It is especially important for us in the intelligence community to maintain the warm and traditional ties that have existed with the academic community for many years. Public criticism of past intelligence activities has caused these ties to fray in recent years, but I am dedicated to trying to rebuild them in every way possible. This relationship is important to us because so much of what we do is not cloak and dagger, spy drama work; it is straightforward, hard analysis and research just as is done on every academic campus in our country. With us, as with any research institution, outside stimulation is vital. You need people who will come in from the outside and question your hypotheses or look at different alternatives. The influence of academia on intelligence analysis is extremely valuable in this regard. We hope also that when we work with academics, there will be a fruitful exchange of ideas in the opposite direction as well. One contribution we can make is in imparting insights on how government processes around the world actually operate.

In addition to this open and wholesome relationship with the intelligence community, the academic community contributes in another absolutely essential way. Our life's blood comes from the annual input of college graduates into various intelligence organizations. We don't need many, but we need some of the best. I hope that in the years ahead some of you here today will consider working in government. If you do, I urge you to look at the whole spectrum of agencies and departments, including the intelligence organizations. I can assure you our work is as challenging and intellectual as any you will find in any profession. The opportunities are almost unlimited.

If you consider a career in intelligence, I am sure you will ask yourself the same questions that I asked myself when the President called me back just a little over a year ago and told me that this was what he wanted me to do. I first asked, what must be done today to collect intelligence information our policymakers need and analyze it properly? Secondly, how can that be

done while still respecting the constitutional rights of American citizens as well as protecting basic American values? Well, I am happy to tell you that in the year since I asked these questions and others like them, I have examined our activities carefully. I believe we are in the midst of an important transformation in the American intelligence community. It has been going on for a couple of years and it is causing to be created a new model of intelligence, a distinctly American model. Let me describe four changes or trends that are occurring in the American intelligence community that examplify this model.

First, our product has changed. When you look back, just over 30 years, to the time when a centralized American intelligence activity was first organized. The primary product of intelligence was information about military activities of the Soviet Union and maybe a little bit about some of their satellites. Look how the world has changed. Today we have important intercourse with almost all of the 150 some nations of the world. Our relations with the vast majority of those nations are far more in the political and economic spheres than in the military, so the focus of our collection and anlysis has been shifting from a singular concentration on military affairs to a broader interest in all areas of international relations. It has required more of us, new skills, new areas of expertise.

Let me not overstate the case. Understanding Soviet military intelligence is still our number one priority and must remain so. But, today we are being called upon to expand our areas of interest and include much more than before. We are getting into international economic analysis, into questions of anti-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, the world energy situation and its prospects. It is new, it is exciting, it is demanding.

The second trend in intelligence is in the changes which are taking place in our production line itself. Historically, the basic producer of intelligence has always been the human agent, the spy. Going back at least as far as Jericho, you will recall, Joshua sent two spies inside the walls of Jericho before he marched around with his trumpets. Well, we have had a technological revolution in the last decade and a half which has profoundly influenced how we collect intelligence. The human spy is no longer our only means of collecting information. Today technical systems produce prodigious quantities of information. I suspect this is not an uncommon phenomenon to you in the academic world because there has also been a great proliferation

of information available to scholars as well. Scholars have been challenged, just as have our analysts, to sort it all out. How do you keep track of it? How do you tell what is germane so that you can fit it in with other information and construct a useful picture? The difficult but interesting challenge of changing our production line in such a way as to absorb these quantities of new, technically derived data lies ahead of us.

However, even with this great flow of technical data coming in, the need for the traditional, human intelligence agent is increasing. Why? Because, generally speaking, technically collected information tells us what happened somewhere in the world yesterday or maybe today. When I pass this to a policymaker I am always asked why something happened and what I think may happen next. Finding out what people are thinking and what their intentions are is the forte of the human intelligence agent.

So today, the difference in the intelligence production line is that instead of having a single machine collecting information we have many machines - human and technical. To be effective, they must work as a team, carefully meshing and complementing each other, one filling the gaps that the other misses.

The third trend which distinguishes the American model from other models of intelligence is our movement toward greater openness. Traditionally, intelligence services have operated with maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. I do not think we can do that any more in this country nor do we want to. I believe the American public has the right to know as much about our intelligence process and the results of our analyses as we can let them know so they will better understand what we are doing and the nature of our contribution. Consequently, we speak more to the public like I am tonight; we participate more in symposia and conferences; we respond more fully to questions from the media; and we publish more. We publish monographs that are important to you in the academic community and we hope important to the public as well. I have brought some examples of these unclassified monographs with me tonight and you are welcome to take them with you.

When we publish a classified study, we look at it carefully to determine what parts, if revealed, would identify sources and prevent us from getting this kind of information again, or would deprive our policymakers of some unique advantage if known. After those parts have been removed, if there is enough substance left to be of value, we publish it. We have published approximately two declassified studies a week for the past year. I believe this initiative will help focus thinking on important issues and may improve the quality of American debate.

Unfortunately, in this competitive and partially closed world there is no way that an effective intelligence activity could be conducted without withholding a great many secrets. However, publishing as much as we can may help us protect truly sensitive information better. When there is too much classified information, there is less respect for it. People realize much of it does not need to be classified and some take it upon themselves to correct the problem. In recent years a few irresponsible individuals have published information which in the interest of our country should not have been published. We cannot tolerate that much longer because the ultimate logic of what they are doing is for each one of us 215 million Americans to have the right to determine what the government should classify and what it should not. I think the time has come to again place a modicum of trust in appointed and elected officials and not assume that they are all just out to censure or suppress information for their own personal benefit. At the same time, it is not necessary to take us on trust alone. Out of the crucible of the last three years of public criticism a new process of oversight has been forged. And that is the fourth trend I would like to mention.

As much of our work must remain secret, total public oversight is impossible. How then can you be sure that what we are doing is both legal and proper? Several new safeguards exist which monitor fully our activities. They provide the average citizen, or the members of the intelligence community themselves, with an avenue through which concerns, complaints, or questions can be brought to light and examined. These surrogates act for the general public in overseeing the intelligence process.

The first surrogate is in the White House itself. The President and Vice President take a very active and daily interest in intelligence activities. I meet with them regularly and they are kept completely informed.

The second is the Intelligence Oversight Board, an organization created just two years ago. We are privileged to have with us tonight one of the members of that Board, the distinguished former Senator from Tennessee, Senator Albert Gore. Along with Senator Gore, Governor Bill Scranton from Pennsylvania, and Mr. Tom Farmer, an attorney from Washington, D.C., are the three members of this board. They are appointed by the President of the United States and they report only to him. Anyone of you, any one of my employees, may communicate directly with them. They will look at each issue raised and determine whether it warrants action. They then report what they have found directly to the President.

Beyond this, during the past several years two committees have been created in the Congress: a Select Committee on Intelligence in the Senate and another in the House of Representatives. Your own Senator "Dee" Huddleston is a member of the Senate committee. He is a very fine man and a delight to work with. These committees exercise a true oversight function by scrutinizing our work and providing advice and guidance when appropriate. We report to them in considerable detail and find this new relationship very useful and important.

At the same time, there are risks in oversight. The more people who know a secret, the greater the risk that it will be leaked. If too many people are brought into the process, passing judgment on every intelligence action, there is the risk that we will grow timid in what we are willing to do. We cannot have intelligence by timidity nor can we have worthwhile intelligence if there are continuous leaks. It is, therefore, crucial that a balance be struck between the amount of oversight which will ensure protection against abuses and the amount which will unduly increase the danger of leaks or timidity. Candidly, it will be several years before this balance settles out and we know just where we stand.

In the meantime, as Professor Davis has indicated, the President, recognizing these and other trends in the intelligence process, and recognizing the continuing need for a strong American intelligence organization, signed an Executive Order on the 24th of January which reorganizes the intelligence community's structure. In spirit it goes back to the National Security Act of 1947 which attempted to establish the Director of Central Intelligence as an individual who could coordinate all of our intelligence activities. Over time the intelligence process did not develop quite that way.

So, this January the President strengthened my authority as the Director of Central Intelligence - not Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which is a separate assignment - in several ways. He gave me the authority to develop and present to him and the Congress the budget for the entire national intelligence activity.

Secondly, he gave me full authority to task collection elements of the intelligence community, whether or not they are actually owned or operated by the CIA. It is my responsibility to see to it that these assets are collecting what policymakers need, and they are coordinated so there is neither unnecessary duplication, nor dangerous gaps.

Third, he has given me greater authority to bring together the analytic elements of our community to assure that we analyze what policymakers need. But here there are necessary and important limits. I have not been given any authority to direct the analytic work of agencies outside the CIA - those in Defense, or State or Treasury, for example. We must continue to have competitive analysis so that divergent views are able to come forward; so the decision-makers really receive a spectrum of alternatives, not just a coordinated single view. None of us is smart enough to interpret any factual information that perfectly.

And finally, the President's new order establishes a committee on the National Security Council which gives overall direction to me and all intelligence activities in terms of what we should be doing and in what priority.

I believe these trends will strengthen our ability to collect and analyze the intelligence information which our country's policymakers need. We are the most capable intelligence service in the world today and I am dedicated to keeping us that way. At the same time I believe the new procedures I have outlined will strengthen our ability to do this important job in ways that will support the institutions and ideals of our country. I am dedicated to that goal as well.

Thank you very much.